Alcaine

ABSTRACT

A long process of free-market reforms and gradual democratization seems to be dismantling Mexico's corporatist system of labor representation. A thorough analysis of the country's corporatist institutions yields theoretical reasons to believe that Mexico's practice of labor relations is indeed changing. An empirical examination of the nation's labor congress and ruling party during the two previous presidential administrations (1988-2000) demonstrates that corporatism is being transformed at a practical level, although the process of reform has been complex and uneven at best. The continuing strength of an officialist labor sector will complicate the task of establishing a new system of labor representation, a problem that may have important implications for future democratic consolidation.

Although the electoral victory by Vicente Fox of the Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN) on June 2, 2000, put an end to 71 years of control of the Mexican presidency by members of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), its longer-term implications for traditional Mexican institutional arrangements are still undetermined. One question of particular interest is the possible impact this victory will have on the country's traditional state corporatist system of labor relations. Although the Fox administration may well witness a thorough dismantling of Mexican corporatism, analysis of recent changes in corporatist practice during the administrations of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-94) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) suggests that the outcome may more complex and uncertain.

Even before Fox's election, a series of events led many observers to believe that the end of corporatism was imminent. Most notably, the death on June 21, 1997, of Fidel Velazquez, 97, longtime leader of Mexico's most important labor organization, the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM), not only symbolized the apparent passing of the old system but also left the officialist labor movement without one of its most ardent and skilled defenders.1 Although Velazquez's successor at the helm of the CTM, Leonardo Rodriguez Alcaine, promised to continue his predecessor's policies (La Jornada 1997), this stated commitment belied how much the increased levels of democracy had already altered many corporatist practices. As president, Zedillo in particular had emphasized a process of democratization that seemed at odds with the authoritarian practices long associated with Mexican corporatism.

The relationship between democracy and corporatism is far from simple, however, and, as this study will argue, it cannot be assumed that one merely replaces the other over time. Indeed, the relationship between democratization and corporatist change can be reciprocal: not only can democratization reshape corporatist practice, but changes in corporatist structures can have a critical impact on democratic consolidation.

Much of the published analysis of recent changes in Mexican labor relations has focused primarily on how a shift from import substitution to export-led growth strategies has undercut populist political coalitions forged during an earlier period (see, for example, Bensusan Areous 1992; Collier 1992; de la Garza Toledo 1994; Grayson 1998; Middlebrook 1995). While that economic reorientation has undoubtedly affected state-labor relations in Mexico, this study will show that as an explanation for change it is, at best, partial. Democratization-understood here to include a decline in highly centralized presidential power, greater electoral competition and uncertainty, and greater tolerance for political opposition-itself plays an independent and critical role in determining both the pace and the nature of change in structures of labor representation.

To understand how democratization can affect nonelectoral institutional arrangements, this paper will begin by exploring the traditional institutional characteristics of Mexico's system of interest intermediation. It will identify three specific areas of corporatist bargaining in the country, in order to clarify how these practices have been challenged by democratization and how, in turn, democratic consolidation may be affected by corporatist change. The paper will then empirically examine growing tensions among corporatist institutions since 1988, with a particular emphasis on changes in the national labor congress and the ruling party during the Salinas and Zedillo periods. On the basis of this examination, the study concludes that corporatist practice has been significantly altered by a process of democratization but that the change has been multifaceted and complex. The sustained strength of an officialist labor sector has so far allowed that sector to resist formal, structural changes in Mexican corporatism, even while the manner in which corporatism operates has been significantly altered.

THE COMPONENTS OF TRADITIONAL MEXICAN CORPORATISM

To understand the changes in Mexican labor relations during the Salinas and Zedillo years, it is important to review the characteristics of the traditional corporatist system as it has affected organized labor. First, it is necessary to distinguish between strictly corporatist institutional arrangements and a wide variety of associated policies and practices (including specific legal protections for labor and social welfare legislation) that are not, in and of themselves, corporatist. According to the framework provided by Philippe Schmitter (1974), corporatism is defined here as a form of interest intermediation, a formalized system of bargaining between representatives of the state, labor organizations, and the private business sector. Schmitter further distinguishes between "state corporatism," in which the government exercises a high level of control and influence over the constituent corporatist groups, and "societal corporatism," in which those groups maintain a significantly greater degree of autonomy from the state.

Postrevolutionary Mexico was characterized by strong elements of state corporatism, although the country never operated along purely corporatist lines, and some sectors of society were tied to these arrangements much more closely than others. Here it is important to recall another of Schmitter's concepts, that of partial regimes (1992). According to this conceptualization, a single polity may have a series of distinct structures of representation, depending on the types of groups involved and the arena in which they compete for influence. In the Mexican context, state corporatist arrangements operated side by side with other systems of representation, including electoral and clientelistic systems. Corporatist forms of representation were probably more relevant for organized labor than for virtually any other sector in society, but even here it is necessary to disaggregate the system according to the specific arena through which labor sought to channel its demands. Specifically, this presents three separate levels: macro, micro, and party corporatism.

Perhaps the most politically important level is macrocorporatism, which involves national-level, tripartite discussions of a series of economic and political policies. This practice is partly mandated by the Mexican constitution and federal labor law and partly laid at the discretion of the executive and legislative branches.2 it has long been the state's practice to include labor and business representatives in peak bargaining over a range of important issues.3 Negotiations have involved many substantive issues, including the overall direction of economic policy and efforts to improve national productivity levels. These efforts often ended in the signing of pacts, most notably those regarding wageprice controls.4 While the representatives chosen to bargain on the labor side have varied by time and issue, as a general rule they have come exclusively from the ranks of the National Labor Congress, or Congreso del Trabajo (CT), and nearly always have included representatives of the largest labor confederation, the CTM.

Labor is also represented in discussions at a local or firm level through its inclusion in federal and state labor arbitration boards; this practice is known as microcorporatism. The boards determine a range of worksite issues affecting individual labor organizations, including the legality of strikes, the recognition of bargaining units, and the occurrence of contract violations. Unlike macrocorporatism, for which labor inclusion has traditionally occurred at the discretion of the president, union representation on these labor arbitration boards has been codified under federal labor law since 1931.

Corporatism has also effectively operated at the level of the ruling party. Since its founding in 1938 as the Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana and its later reorganization as the current Partido Revolucionario Institucional, the party has formally incorporated labor as a "sector" with nominal voting rights.5 Under this system, individual labor unions formally joined the party and became voting members of its "labor sector" (or, in a few cases, its "popular sector"). The inclusion of labor enabled the PRI to negotiate the slate of candidates it ran in each election. Over the years, representatives of PRI-affiliated labor organizations consequently secured a not-insignificant share of nominations for elected posts, including those in the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, and state governorships. In return, those organizations were often expected to deliver the votes and organizational support of their rank and file, even if that required coercive or fraudulent means. While such partisan activity might seem a matter of civil society participation rather than state inclusion, the PRI's former role as a quasi-governmental institution with a virtual monopoly on elected public offices made such sectoral representation corporatist in character.

Although analytically distinct, these three levels of corporatism were tightly linked in practice and in the context of strong presidentialism and one-party rule. While each level could, and often did, function separately, the chief executive maintained the ability to intervene in such a way as to determine the outcome of local and national-level economic bargaining, and generally had the final say in the allocation of party nominations.

Thus a strong president, backed by the PRI's political dominance, could establish informal "metarules" governing labor representation, defining overall labor policy, and determining how much individual labor organizations were to be included, rewarded, or punished through the course of corporatist bargaining at all three levels. In linking each of the three dimensions of Mexican labor corporatism, presidentialism ensured that the system acted essentially as a "package deal." Generally speaking, unions either were "officialist" and accepted corporatist inclusion both in its positive and negative aspects, or they were largely "independent" of those arrangements. For those choosing the latter path, nearcomplete exclusion from state representational mechanisms ensured their political weakness and, on numerous occasions, led to severe government actions to break strikes or to remove their leadership.

Obviously, some variation in the position of officialist and independent unions always existed, and a small number of unions always managed to negotiate successfully between those two poles. Notable examples are the electrical workers of the Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas (SME) and the telephone workers of the Sindicato de Telefonistas de la Republica Mexicana (STRM). These unions followed a path defined elsewhere (Samstad 1998) as "plural clientelist" unionism, with a pattern of interest intermediation based on informal, personalistic ties to individual officeholders. This arrangement ultimately served to reduce the groups' relative autonomy from the state-although perhaps not as much as officialist unionism did. This form of unionism traditionally was very much the exception rather than the rule, however, and unions generally either had to choose a path of tight linkage with the political system or remain precariously at its margins.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND CORPORATISM

Even before Fox's victory, the relative coherence and unity of Mexico's corporatist system was being seriously challenged by economic and political changes. Economically, the previous two decades had seen a dramatic reorientation of the country from a strategy of import substitution industrialization (ISI) toward an export-led growth (ELG) model. The process began with a severe debt crisis starting in August 1982, just four months before Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-88) took office. The crisis pushed the Mexican state toward a program of budget cuts, privatizations of state firms, and credit restrictions that limited the state's ability to continue subsidizing domestic industrialization. By 1985 De la Madrid had agreed to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), making clear that his earlier policies were not merely shortterm responses to a fiscal crisis but part of a longer-term reorientation of the economy. A full embrace of the ELG model came during the following administration under Salinas, who, besides accelerating his predecessor's privatization program, negotiated Mexico's entrance into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada beginning in 1994.

The shift to ELG clearly created tensions in the political coalition forged under ISI. The state's earlier lead role in fostering industrialization and building domestic markets for these locally produced goods was more compatible with policies to raise wages, promote collective bargaining, and ensure higher levels of employment at state-owned firms. In addition, the government's ample control of economic resources provided significant opportunities to disburse patronage and foster clientelistic ties to key allies, including labor leaders. Cutbacks in government spending and ownership, along with an emphasis on attracting investment and promoting trade through competitively low wages, virtually guaranteed increased tensions in the old state-labor coalition.

Economic factors alone, however, are inadequate to fully explain corporatist change in Mexico. Export orientation is not necessarily incompatible with corporatist structures. Indeed, according to the classic formulation of Peter Katzenstein (1985), export specialization was, during earlier decades, a key factor in fostering corporatism, as many small, economically vulnerable European states sought close ties between government, industry, and unions in order to ensure labor peace. If Mexican corporatism presented certain costs to a market-oriented state by offering a degree of resistance to programs such as privatization, free trade agreements, and wage constraints, it also gave the government a series of compensatory advantages: mechanisms to limit strikes and other labor conflicts, to implement wage-price controls during times of inflation, and to mobilize working-class political support for the PRI regime at a time of declining real wages. Thus corporatist institutions in Mexico managed to persist in spite of the state's thorough reorientation toward ELG over nearly 20 years.

More recently, however, a new source of pressure has emerged that presents perhaps a greater challenge to corporatism as it has traditionally operated: increasing levels of procedural democracy. Although the PRI held a virtual monopoly of local and national elective offices through the end of the De la Madrid administration, by the sexenio of Salinas, opposition parties had begun to win a series of local offices, including several governorships and key municipalities. This process accelerated during the Zedillo administration, when opposition parties began to win a very substantial number of such offices, including, for the first time, a majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies after 1997. This growing presence of opposition parties, in turn, served to constrain the once-powerful Mexican presidency, as did the presence of mass media that were increasingly open and critical in their coverage of the administration.

Corporatism, it should be emphasized, is not necessarily incompatible with democracy. A number of democratic countries in Western Europe, for example, continue to maintain systems of corporatist intermediation. Many of these institutions, however, were essentially "born democratic," operating in a more representative manner since their conception. Mexican corporatism, in contrast, has traditionally acted as an integral part of the country's authoritarian system; for the country to operate in a fully democratic manner, these institutions need to undergo a transformation in how they operate or else be dismantled altogether.6

The new pressure on Mexican corporatism therefore did not come as a surprise. The democratization of Mexico's political system was expected to promote change in current corporatist practice, for at least four related theoretical reasons. First, the decline of strong, authoritarian presidentialism leads to a corresponding increase in the influence of other actors, ensuring that each of the three separate mechanisms of corporatism acts in a more autonomous rather than coordinated manner. Instead of augmenting the power of the Mexican president, as they traditionally have, corporatist institutions can work to limit the chief executive's power. For example, while the president may continue to play a substantial role in macrocorporatist bargaining, other institutions, such as the nation's legislature, may gain a new and perhaps decisive role in determining when and how these types of negotiations will occur.

In terms of microcorporatism, representatives on local arbitration boards may begin to have greater autonomy from the president, inhibiting the latter's ability to determine the outcome of specific labor conflicts by fiat. To the extent that the PRI developed internal decisionmaking processes that reduced the president's ability to decide policies and candidates unilaterally, party-based corporatist inclusion also should increase the influence of other actors in these areas of decisionmaking, leading to a relative decline in the president's power.

The second theory is that greater demands for democratization from civil society would be likely to generate resistance from many rank-andfile labor union members to the traditional authoritarian practices of their leadership. Much of the authoritarian character of the country's traditional corporatist system has come not just from the state's asymmetrical influence over officialist labor leaders but also from those leaders' authoritarian control over their own rank and file. A combination of weaker state support for authoritarian union leaders and rank-and-file exposure to democratic participation in other areas of their lives might encourage internal movements seeking procedural democracy. In a more democratic society, external actors, such as Congress or the Supreme Court, might also intervene to ensure greater democracy in the labor unions.7

This potential effect should not be overstated, of course. Nondemocratic unions frequently exist even in democratic countries, and there is no reason to believe that democratization in Mexico will completely eliminate nondemocratic practices among the nation's unions. Still, these practices should be further delegitimated as the nation experiences greater democratic participation nationally, and new pressures to change the function of traditional unions are bound to arise.

Third, greater party competition opens alternative channels for worker representation while making sectoral inclusion in the PRI much less important to labor. Workers should find that they, as individuals, have other effective means of voicing political demands than merely their participation in labor unions (Hernandez Rodriguez 1992). These alternative means could include voting, and participation in civil society groups not associated with the ruling party. As opposition parties gain more power, unions as organizations could begin to find political influence by aligning with parties other than the PRI, or even by endorsing candidates from different parties in each election. For labor organizations that remain members of the PRI, such participation would come to resemble less a form of corporatism and more a pluralistic form of partisan participation.

Democratization inherently requires that the PRI no longer function as a branch of the government but instead as an autonomous entity in competition with other parties for political office. A union's participation in that party, therefore, would no longer grant it an assured degree of power and political bargaining rights as it had in prior years. Indeed, democratization potentially might lead the PRI to abandon its corporatist structure altogether, as greater competition for votes pushes the party to broaden its base beyond its traditional sectors.

Finally, democratization leads to a power shift among societal actors, with new groups gaining greater inclusion and existing organizations increasing or decreasing their power. In the Mexican case, there is strong reason to believe that organized labor as a whole could see its relative political position diminished. The private sector, for example, once politically tied to the governing PRI and fairly dependent on government subsidy, has begun to organize autonomously from the state and corporatist institutions. This step has led to increasing calls from powerful business groups to modify corporatist institutions to reduce the role of labor (see Carrasco Licea 1995). Concurrently, with much of the labor movement long associated with the PRI, the party's decline in political power might potentially lead to attempts to undermine the structural incorporation of traditional unions in favor of a more pluralistic inclusion of other groups. While earlier opposition victories at state and local levels did not provide the power to change the aspects of corporatism enshrined in the constitution and federal law, recent opposition gains, both in the national congress and at the presidential level, may lead to a complete dismantling of corporatist institutions that grant formal inclusion to labor.

In theory, then, the process of democratization could produce a myriad of pressures to change or even eliminate corporatist structures as they have traditionally operated in Mexico. As Francisco Zapata (1998) has argued, however, Mexican corporatism has demonstrated a remarkable staying power over the years and has managed to operate successfully through a variety of historical circumstances. A review of the last two PRI presidential terms demonstrates both that resilience and the degree to which democratization has altered how corporatism is practiced.

EFFORTS TO REFORM CORPORATISM UNDER SALINAS

Already by the late 1980s, a combination of economic restructuring and political democratization had led to the first clear indications that the corporatist system was fraying. In economic terms, no president was more responsible for reorienting policy toward exports than Salinas, who negotiated, signed, and began implementing NAFTA while promoting the growth of new export industries, especially in the maquiladora (in-bond) manufacturing sector along the U.S. border. The growth of the maquila sector helped to undercut corporatism because many of these plants were marked by weak company unions, both physically and politically far from the center of national corporatist bargaining in Mexico City.8

The share of workers effectively represented by corporatist institutions was further reduced by a dramatic growth of a nonunionized, informal sector during the economic crises of the 1980s. Likewise, privatization and cutbacks in government employment by both Salinas and De la Madrid added to a decline in the number of workers ostensibly represented through corporatist bargaining arrangements.

Yet despite these economic changes, the structure of corporatism saw relatively little alteration during the Salinas sexenio, and some of the most important changes that did occur resulted more from political than economic factors (for a summary, see table 1). Elected in 1988 with barely a majority in the official vote tally and hounded by widespread allegations of having engaged in electoral fraud to achieve that victory, Salinas needed to refurbish the image of the ruling party if he was to exercise an incumbent's traditional prerogative of successfully naming his own successor.

Salinas's efforts included attempts to change the popular image of the PRI as a party dependent on corrupt, authoritarian labor bosses. In a May 1990 speech, the president announced a project of a "new unionism" that promised to move the labor sector away from corporatist mechanisms of intermediation and control (for a fuller discussion, see Samstad and Collier 1995). While the government was, at best, inconsistent in its promotion of new unionism, and while the majority of officialist labor organizations strongly resisted changes in traditional corporatism, by the end of the sexenio a number of unions began to chart a path that was neither officialist nor independent in the traditional sense.

New unionism sought to make labor organizations internally more representative but not more militant. Union-management relations were to become more cooperative, with firms providing incentives for increased productivity. In addition, labor relations as a whole were to be changed to increase union autonomy, though with the proviso that the country's "historic" state-labor alliance would be maintained. Salinas's new unionism, then, could be viewed partly as a move away from authoritarian corporatist control of labor leaders by the state and of the rank and file by their leaders. In particular, the emphasis on more participatory and representative unions appeared to be motivated by a desire to abandon what had become a largely discredited form of authoritarian electoral mobilization through union-organized fraud and coercion in favor of a more pluralist-style reliance on endorsements for the PRI from more popular and democratically elected union leaders.9

Although initially only a few unions began to orient their practices toward those envisioned by new unionism, the project proved of lasting importance in opening political space between traditional officialism and more confrontational forms of independence. The most significant step toward greater labor pluralism during the sexenio came with the April 1990 formation of the Federacion de Sindicatos de Empresas de Bienes y Servicios (Federation of Unions of Goods and Services Companies, or Fesebes; officially referred to as Fesebs). Led by the electricistas of the SME and the telefonistas of the STRM, the new federation linked a number of unions whose relationship with the state had been closer to that of plural clientelism than either officialism or pure independence. These included unions representing railroad and streetcar workers, pilots, airline service workers, and film industry workers, later joined by a union of Volkswagen plant workers and one of financial services employees. Although the Fesebes leadership represented a relatively small percentage of the labor force, Salinas allowed it to play a strong, visible role in peak bargaining. The Fesebes unions also retained their own membership in the CT, producing a new counterweight to the CTM in that organization.

Nevertheless, at the end of the Salinas administration, labor corporatism was still largely intact, as existing officialist organizations successfully maneuvered to preserve its institutional underpinnings. Under the guidance of Fidel Velazquez, labor organizations strategically chose to acquiesce to most of Salinas's neoliberal economic policies while concentrating their efforts on preserving the institutional sources of their political power (see Samstad and Collier 1995). Despite calls by powerful business groups for large-scale changes in the labor laws (COPARMEX 1989), Velazquez and others used a combination of strongly worded public declarations and astute backroom bargaining with political leaders to halt government moves toward overhauling the existing legislation. Through similar efforts, including thinly veiled threats to support opposition parties, the CTM and other officialist labor groups were able to block nascent proposals to eliminate labor's sectoral representation in the PRI.10 The government's ongoing worries about inflation and the labor leaders' willingness to agree to "voluntary" wage-price pacts also ensured continued tripartite economic bargaining at the national level.

Overall, then, the structures of Mexican corporatism saw little formal change during the Salinas sexenio.11 At the same time, democratizing pressure was leading to greater political pluralism in the CT, a phenomenon that would help to reshape labor representation during the next administration.

THE EROSION OF CORPORATISM UNDER ZEDILLO

With much of the shift toward export strategies having already taken place during the previous two administrations, Zedillo's economic approach represented a continuation of previous policies rather than a sharp break with the past. The more pronounced changes were the tremendous political shifts that occurred. Even more than his predecessor, Zedillo seemed unable or unwilling to exercise the same degree of traditional presidential authority that may have helped to slow the unraveling of the old system. His term in office saw an increasing number of opposition victories at the state and local level-including the PRI's loss of its majority in the lower house of Congress in 1997-which made it impossible for the president to act as unilaterally as his predecessors traditionally had.

As the trend toward competitive electoral democracy accelerated in the years leading up to Fox's victory, corporatist bargaining arrangements began to be undercut in at least two critical ways. First, greater freedom to maneuver without the same fears of reprisals that had existed during earlier periods allowed labor organizations to seek alternative forms of representation outside the CT, leading to a split in that organization. Second, growing electoral competition increased pressure to change the ruling PRI to make it more inclusive and internally democratic, which worked to reduce the influence of the party's traditional corporatist sectors in determining future elected officials. At the same time, these changes still had only a partial effect. The traditional corporatist sectors still retained much power, and the president had less ability to push through a more dramatic party restructuring, which might have helped the PRI to retain power longer.

Rupture in the Labor Congress

The small set of unions that came together to form Fesebes during the Salinas years tried to bridge the two poles of officialist and independent organizations. The Fesebes unions remained in the CT but avoided practicing many of the less democratic behaviors associated with traditional officialism. Around the beginning of the Zedillo administration, however, Fesebes leaders began to take advantage of the more open political climate and to look for other like-minded organizations with which to form a larger alliance.

In February 1995, Fesebes joined a number of other unions to create what became the Foro: El Sindicalismo ante la Nacion (Forum on Unionism Facing the Nation)as an alternative voice for labor (Reyes 1996; Martinez and Vazquez 1997b). Comprising about two dozen unions in all, the Foro included the nation's largest union, the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educacion (SNTE), representing teachers, along with workers at the national university with the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la UNAM (STUNAM), Social Security administrators with the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Seguridad Social (SNTSS), and the Confederacion Obrera Revolucionaria (COR). This new group explicitly sought union democracy and autonomy from the state and political parties, and challenged the government's neoliberal economic policies, even while still remaining in the CT. But the foristas, as they came to be known, angered the CT's dominant officialist leadership by defying its decision not to march in May Day protests of Zedillo's austerity policies (La Jornada 1995).12 The CT leadership endorsed Zedillo's privatization of social security, drawing protests from the Foro unions and causing tensions to grow (Correa 1995). Internally, the Foro unions attempted to promote CT democratization and to wrest control of the organization from the CTM and its allies (Becerril 1996a; Calderon Gomez 1997). In response, the CT leadership openly threatened the foristas with expulsion.

On May Day 1997 forista leaders had announced their intention permanently to leave the National Labor Congress and to form a new "central" that would avoid both corporatism and political clientelism (Martinez and Vazquez 1997a; Urruti and Martinez 1997). After Fidel Velazquez's death in June, the new CTM leadership under Rodriguez Alcaine attempted to negotiate these unions' return to the labor congress, only to see the efforts fall apart in the following weeks (Vazquez 1997b; Martinez and Vazquez 1997c). Yet during this period of negotiations, a deep division among the foristas themselves also surfaced. On one side was the faction associated with Francisco Hernandez Juarez, leader since 1976 of the telefonistas and first president of Fesebes. This group wished to remain outside the CT in spite of Rodriguez Alcaine's promises to restructure the labor congress (Excelsior 1997). Opposing this view and seeking to remain in the CT as a way of maintaining labor unity were those associated with Elba Esther Gordillo, the Salinas-era leader of SNTE, who had become head of the PRI's popular sector under Zedillo.13 A total of 9 of the 26 forista organizations sided with Gordillo, including SNTE (which alone claimed a full 84 percent of the Foro's membership), the COR, and, perhaps surprising given its role in founding Fesebes, the SME (Cano 1997; Martinez and Vazquez 1997b).14

The decision by the Gordillo faction to remain in the CT was both a blessing and a curse for labor congress leaders. While the CT managed to keep many of its largest and most important members in its ranks, the organization of a mesa sindical (labor roundtable) by these unions to push for CT reform ensured continued internal division (Correa 1997a). Pressure from this group helped to force the CT to institute direct and secret voting for its president, although in the absence of many of the old Foro organizations, the CTM continued to hold sway over internal elections (Martinez 1997).

The Hernandez Juarez movement presented perhaps a greater challenge to the CT and the structure of corporatism. By leaving the labor congress, these unions caused by far the most serious split in the CT's 31-year history. By the end of 1997, the movement had grown significantly, with organizations claiming 1.5 million members joining together to form the Union Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT) as a direct rival organization to the main National Labor Congress (Correa 1997b; Martinez and Urruti 1997).15 These groups included DINA automobile workers; metalworkers with the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria del Metal, Hierro, Acero, Conexos y Similares (STIMHACS); farm workers associated with the Central Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y Campesinos (CIOAC), a confederation of rural unions; and even two thousand university workers from Nuevo Leon who quit the CTM to join the UNT (Urruti et al. 1997). Soon afterward, one of the country's bestknown federations of "independent" unions, the Frente Autentico del Trabajo (FAT), joined the new organization (Urrutia and Cervantes 1997).

The UNT continued the Foro's earlier positions by calling for an end to PRI corporatism, an increase in union autonomy, a defense of labor rights, and a renegotiation of NAFTA. The UNT's position opposing corporatism was more a call to end the authoritarian labor practices of the past than a refusal to engage in peak bargaining as earlier non-CT labor groups had done. In particular, the organization sought inclusion in the national commission on the minimum wage, only to see its efforts rejected by Labor Secretary Javier Bonilla Garcia (Cervantes 1997). This rejection underscored not only the UNT's still-tenuous position but more basic institutional obstacles in trying to force a redefinition of macrocorporatist inclusion.

The splits in the CT presented a challenge at all three levels of Mexican corporatism. At the macro level, they threw open the question of which organizations had a right to inclusion in peak bargaining and to what degree the process of labor representation would be democratized. Divisions in the labor central also made the process of tripartite bargaining more difficult. Facing a financial meltdown in December 1994, Zedillo at first attempted to impose a new emergency wage-price pact. The soon-to-be forista unions rejected the administration's initial proposals, forcing substantial changes to the pact (Corro 1995). Even then, one CT union, the electrical workers' SME, refused to sign the final document. When the administration sought further modifications to this emergency pact three months later, Zedillo could not gain the support of the entire CT. This forced him to impose changes unilaterally without first obtaining the formal consent of the officialist labor sector, as had been the practice since De la Madrid first introduced the pacts in 1987.

Facing serious divisions in the CT and a president willing to bypass traditional corporatist pactmaking, CTM leader Fidel Velazquez began to seek agreements directly with the traditional business chambers. In a twist that might be termed "corporatism without government," between early to mid-1995 the CTM signed bilateral agreements with the National Chamber of the Manufacturing Industries (Canacintra) and the Business Confederation of Mexico (COPARMEX), promising to work to avoid strikes, layoffs, and plant closures (Becerril 1995a). In August 1996, Velazquez decided to sign a second, more ambitious pact with COPARMEX promising a "new labor culture" marked by greater cooperation between labor and management and the elimination of corrupt practices (Becerril 1996b; Gallegos and Becerril 1996).16 In the interim, more traditional forms of pactmaking returned with the signing of trilateral wage-price controls in October 1995 (Llanos et al. 1995).17 This reprise was only temporary, however, and as inflation began to subside and a substantial sector of organized labor continued to be sharply critical of the administration, the traditional wageprice agreements were quietly abandoned by the end of 1996, eliminating an important source of tripartite bargaining in the process.

At the micro level, the CT's internal divisions appeared to jeopardize for a time many of labor's rights to representation via the federal and local arbitration boards. Labor's future status on these boards was placed in question when a weakened officialist labor sector reluctantly agreed to negotiate changes in the federal labor law.18 During the Salinas years, any proposed change in this law had drawn strong and unified opposition from the main officialist labor federations.19 This pattern continued until shortly after Velazquez's death, when his successor, Rodriguez Alcaine, hesitantly agreed to negotiations over such changes, despite his admitted pessimism about their chances to improve conditions for workers (Vazquez 1997a). While the UNT decided to embrace the idea of negotiating changes in the labor law, other labor organizations, such as the Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), opposed negotiations altogether. These divisions in the CT ultimately contributed to the Zedillo administration's failure to change the law.

Labor's Tenuous Position in Party Corporatism

The CT's divisions also had a significant impact on party-based corporatism, especially combined with broader societal shifts toward democratization. Within the PRI, labor leaders such as Gordillo and Hernandez Juarez pushed to democratize the party's internal structure and to eliminate collective party memberships, arguing that they violated the rank and file's freedom of association (Gordillo 1997; Calderon and Cruz 1997; Urruti and Martinez 1997). While efforts by the Zedillo administration to eliminate sectoral representation failed, those and outside pressures, combined with a string of opposition victories nationally, were reshaping the PRI's role as a corporatist institution.

A more democratic PRI began to alter the way it traditionally rewarded loyal labor leaders with elective offices. The party also moved toward a system of primaries to select its presidential candidate, thus partly bypassing labor's nominal voting rights as an official party sector. Increasingly strong opposition parties, furthermore, made labor representation in the PRI less a conduit for state intermediation and more a matter of pluralist civil society participation.

Efforts to change the nature of PRI representation did not come without strong and sometimes quite successful resistance from officialist unions. Perhaps the most important success for these organizations was in blocking, even reversing, Zedillo's effort to reform the PRI in 1996. In July of that year, Zedillo agreed to a pact with congressional opposition party representatives promising that all political parties would consist of individual memberships only, thereby ending corporatist sectoral representation by the PRI (Cuellar et al. 1996). The CTM and other officialist unions responded by effectively taking control of the 17th PRI National Assembly in September. In an unprecedented rebuke of the president, this gathering not only upheld the sectoral structure of the party but rejected a host of other proposed reforms (including a series of anticorruption measures) and roundly criticized the neoliberal economic policies with which Zedillo was associated (Urena 1996; Romero 1996). The assembly further voted to require that any presidential, senatorial, or gubernatorial candidate be a party member for least ten years and have been previously elected with the PRI to public office. This measure represented an implicit criticism of Zedillo and his technocratic predecessors (neither he, Salinas, nor De la Madrid, among other presidents, would have met these criteria). It also attempted to give the party, as an organization, more force in candidate recruitment and selection.

These victories by the officialist labor sector, however, did not reverse the broader process of democratization taking place throughout the country. With Mexico once again in economic crisis, opposition parties began to win a series of impressive electoral victories at the federal, state, and local levels. And with virtually all the country's most important unions associated with the PRI, the corresponding losses helped to undercut labor's political power. The losses also indicated that labor could no longer mobilize votes in order to deliver its end of the political bargain underlying traditional corporatism.

Symbolic of this weakening was the July 1997 mayoral election in Mexico City, held concurrently with the nation's midterm congressional elections. Since the beginning of the campaign, the CTM had organized extensively in favor of its longtime ally, Alfredo del Mazo of the PRI (Olay 1997; Becerril 1997b). At one point, Fidel Velazquez even threatened to expel any worker who voted against the PRI-which, under the nation's closed-shop laws at the time, would have required that the worker be fired (Becerril 1997a). Yet in spite of these extraordinary efforts, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas of the left-of-center Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) won easily, while the PRI also lost its majority in the national Chamber of Deputies.

Changes in the PRI also undercut labor's formerly significant role in candidate selection. Following its show of power in 1996, the officialist labor sector saw its influence wane. During elections for a new PRI president in September 1997, the CT was forced to back Zedillo's nominee despite its apparent disagreement with the choice (Delgado 1997). Within the PRI, the Gordillo faction and others pushed for a series of reforms to democratize the party's nomination process.

The practical benefits of such measures became clear in the July 1997 gubernatorial elections. In the state of Chihuahua, a rare primary for candidate selection yielded a strong PRI candidate, Patricio Martinez, who managed to win the state back from the right-of-center PAN (Gutierrez 1998). The traditional candidate selection methods in Zacatecas, by contrast, led one of the PRI's most popular figures in the state, Ricardo Monreal, to defect to the opposition PRD (Correa 1998). Monreal's subsequent victory underscored the importance of reforming the nomination process in the face of increasing electoral competition.

It was in this context that Zedillo introduced a profound change in the candidate selection process for the 2000 presidential election. In a country with a postrevolutionary tradition prohibiting reelections, outgoing presidents have, in compensation, been allowed to choose their own successors through a process widely known as the dedazo, or finger pointing. With much fanfare, each president, toward the end of his last full year in office, would unveil his choice for the ruling party's next nominee, a selection then ceremoniously ratified at the next PRI convention. Zedillo, instead, let the nomination be determined by a primary held on November 7, 1999. In this election any registered voter, regardless of party affiliation, could choose among one of four "precandidates."

The process was not without controversy. Many observers thought the winner, Zedillo's former interior minister, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, was unfairly favored by the administration, in spite of Zedillo's insistence on his own neutrality in the process.20 Illustrating the persistence of earlier political practices, once Labastida became widely perceived as Zedillo's pick, nearly all the PRI-linked labor organizations endorsed the eventual winner.21

In one sense, it could be argued that the primary process had the potential to give the PRI's labor sector greater participation in presidential candidate selection. Labor's earlier role in the process had been mainly to engage in informal and highly limited consultations with the outgoing president; Fidel Velazquez would personally meet with the incumbent and generally discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the various potential candidates.22 In theory, under a primary system, labor could use its organizational resources and personnel more directly to work for a particular candidate, outside of both corporatist institutions and any position the president may have taken. Yet in this case, what is interesting is how much the labor sector's actions resembled those of previous years, despite the dramatic rule changes. As always, the "official" labor sector waited until the president made clear his own preferred successor and then publicly rallied around the designated candidate.

Much of this continuity persisted because the party's internal corporatist structure had only partly changed, and the labor sector continued to have strong reasons to maintain a favorable relationship even with a lame duck president. For union leaders, the most important aspect of party-based corporatism traditionally has been not the presidential selection process-in which labor had relatively little influence-but other nominations, including governors, senators, and federal deputies, which often directly rewarded the labor leaders themselves. Citing a need to ensure that elected officials remained loyal to the party, the PRI at its January 2000 congress decided not to expand the primary system to nonpresidential nominations. Instead, senate and federal deputy nominees were selected either by a PRI convention in each state or by the traditional process of developing a party list by dedazo, depending on whether the seats were elected by plurality or by proportional representation, respectively (Mendez 2000).23 Under both systems, labor leaders seeking nominations had a stronger incentive to work within the traditional, corporatist mechanisms of representation than they had under an open process of electoral primary competition.

Thus, until the PRI's defeat at the presidential level, change in the party's corporatist structure was limited. Once it lost federal power, however, the party's intermediary role was limited to those states where it still held governorships-20 out of 31 states following the June 2000 election. Now, in contexts where the PRI is an opposition party, labor will function more as a pluralist pressure group than a corporatist bargaining unit. Any future PRI presidential victory, however, could lead to a partial renewal of the party's role as a corporatist intermediator, assuming that its corporatist structure remains intact.

In the interim, the PRI can still award labor nominations, even if individual candidates' victories are no longer guaranteed, as they were during the party's heyday. The ultimate question for party-based corporatism, then, is whether it will be eliminated completely by a PRI seeking to renew itself, or whether its structure of sectoral representation will be maintained as the party tries to block a further erosion of its traditional electoral coalition.

CONCLUSIONS

The experience of the Salinas and Zedillo administrations shows the complexity of reforming a corporatist system that is well entrenched in Mexican society. Despite apparent efforts by both presidents, little structural change has appeared in federal legislation or in the formal organization of the PRI. What change that has occurred has been in how corporatism functioned in practice, and this transformation has come primarily as a side effect of a decline in centralized presidentialism and an increase in political pluralism during the last sexenio.

In terms of macrocorporatism, splits in the main labor congress and the end of negotiated wage-price pacts helped to undercut tripartite peak bargaining. Still, federal and local tripartite bargaining remained a part of the constitution and the federal labor law, and efforts to alter these provisions failed in the face of stiff resistance from the nation's most powerful labor leaders. Similarly, a stalemated process of labor law reform ensured that microcorporatist institutions, especially the labor arbitration boards, remained structurally intact.

Party-based corporatism also changed more in practice than in formal structure. The PRI's nomination process for the presidency moved to a more pluralist system, and even some of the party's prominent labor leaders began to call for reforms in the PRI's corporatist structure. Efforts to eliminate the ruling party's sectoral structure, however, have failed so far, and the system of presidential primaries that Zedillo introduced has not been extended to other elected offices. Such nominations therefore are still a critical area of negotiation between party officials and labor leaders.

Thus democratization has undercut the old corporatist structure at a variety of levels. As individual unions have become less dependent on presidential favor, they have gained greater room to maneuver, taking a wide range of positions and responses. This diversity has inevitably led to a greater disunity among the most important labor organizations, creating problems for the outgoing government in identifying which leaders will represent labor during peak-level negotiations. Likewise, as opposition parties became stronger and as presidential control of the PRI diminished during the Zedillo administration, the ruling party was less able to perform its traditional functions as both a locus of state-labor bargaining and a conduit for awarding labor leaders with positions of political power.

Overall, then, corporatist institutions were partly "delinked" from one another, with the president less able to utilize them together to award and punish individual unions. Particular labor organizations, for their own part, became increasingly able to choose whether to participate in some aspects of corporatist intermediation while maintaining their independence from others.

The election of Vicente Fox promises to reform, if not entirely eliminate, traditional corporatist institutions and practices. But one should not assume that such change will be easy or will be an automatic consequence of the country's democratization. Democracy, perhaps paradoxically, can provide labor with further bargaining power to resist a complete change of the old system. Even after decades of gradual democratization, few other groups in Mexican civil society can claim the same level of organization, membership, and financial resources as the large labor confederations.24 Similarly, nearly all government workers in Mexico belong to a single labor federation, the Federaci6n de Sindicatos de Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado (FSTSE), which continues strongly to advocate upholding the country's corporatist system.25 The government's dependence on a unionized federal and state bureaucracy, and on electoral help from labor, ensured that even the more market-oriented administrations that characterized most of the 1980s and 1990s would fail to eliminate the traditional corporatist system. These same needs may make it difficult for the Fox administration to undertake a similar project.

How efforts to eliminate corporatism will play out depends on a number of key actors, not merely the president. One question is whether the PRI and the traditional labor sector will continue their alliance. Currently holding more than 40 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the PRI by itself can easily prevent Fox from securing the twothirds vote necessary to change the constitution. While there is some pressure for the party to shed its old image and distance itself from the CTM and other confederations, without access to federal resources, the party, in a sense, is more dependent than ever on the financial and organizational backing that these organizations can provide.26

Labor itself may initiate a break with the PRI; a number of unions have already called for an end to the sector's alliance with the party. The more traditional labor confederations, however, may well face suspicion and hostility from existing opposition parties and believe that they have little option but to work with the PRI at a time when the Fox administration is threatening many of their existing rights and privileges. Ultimately, an end to the PRI-labor alliance may instead require a broadbased rank-and-file movement against the existing union leadership, one that to date has yet to emerge.

To the left of the PRI, the PRD may be reluctant to change many aspects of the old system. For example, although this party (as well as the PAN) is on record favoring the elimination of the current system of tripartite bargaining (Ortega and Solis de Alba 1999, 163-67), its legislators, considering its long advocacy of raising salaries for workers, may well hesitate to change the constitution to end corporatist labor representation on the national boards determining the minimum wage and profitsharing, particularly at a time when both the presidency and Congress are controlled by more conservative parties.

None of these considerations mean that Fox will inevitably fail to change the country's corporatist arrangements. Fairly or unfairly, these institutions are widely associated in Mexican society with the PRI and past authoritarianism. Support for their elimination is broad. But as the experience of the past decades shows, altering these institutions will be likely to meet stiff resistance.

Ultimately, the battle over reforming corporatism in Mexico is about more than simply adjusting the system of labor relations after 71 years of rule by the PRI and its predecessor parties. It raises fundamental questions about the ability of Mexican democracy to become fully consolidated. The decline of presidentialism and one-party rule has eliminated key centralizing elements in the political system that once helped to establish "metarules" governing political representation. The future structures of representation are now open to change, and a key element in the consolidation process will be, in Schmitter's terms (1992, 163), reaching societal agreement on "viable rules for limiting uncertainty and ensuring contingent consent." How well the new government can secure a general consensus on these new rules will help to determine the stability of the political system in the long term.

NOTES

1. Velazquez served as general secretary of the CTM from 1941 to 1947 and 1950 to 1997. The passing of a generation of labor leaders was further underscored by the deaths of two other longtime CTM leaders that same year: Blas Chumacero, 92, and Juan Jose Osorio Palacios, 77.

2. Article 123 of the Federal Constitution mandates tripartite bargaining in setting the minimum wage, determining the amount of annual profitsharing on a national level, and administering a federal housing fund. Other forms of bargaining are generally established either by presidential decree or congressional legislation, although informal consultations between the president and established labor and business leaders have also occurred frequently. With regard to the role of the legislature, it is important to recall that before 1997, both houses of Congress were effectively under the control of the presidency.

3. Some bargaining is also conducted by state governments. Some authors refer to this form of intermediation as mesocorporatism (compare Allen and Riemer 1989; Cawson 1985). To simplify the discussion, this work will treat mesocorporatism as simply a part of macrocorporatism.

4. These pacts have had a variety of names. Under President Miguel de la Madrid, a single pact was known as the Pacto de Solidaridad Economica (PASE). Under Salinas they were known first as the Pacto para la Estabilidad y el Crecimiento Economico (PECE) and later the Pacto para la Estabilidad, la Competitividad y el Empleo (also PECE). With Zedillo the pacts were given a variety of names: the Acuerdo de Unidad para Superar la Emergencia Economica (AUSEE), Programa de Accion para Reforzar el AUSSE (PRAUSSE), Alianza para la Recuperacion Econbmica (ARE), and Alianza para el Crecimiento Economico (ACE). For a more thorough discussion of the relationship between these pacts and Mexican corporatism, see Zapata 1998.

5. Between 1929 and 1938, the ruling party existed under the name of Partido Nacional Revolucionario but did not yet have an explicitly corporatist structure.

6. Whether Western European-style democratic corporatism is both possible and desirable in Mexico under current conditions has generated debate among the nation's scholars, particularly during the early 1990s. See Bizberg 1990, Casar 1991, Martin del Campo 1992, and Trejo Delarbre 1990.

7. One noteworthy mechanism of union leaders' undemocratic control has already been eliminated since Fox's election. On April 17, 2001, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled that the country's closed-shop rule (clausua de exclusion) was an unconstitutional infringement on freedom of association (Fuentes 2001). Under this section of federal labor law, union leaders had indirectly been able to fire dissidents in the rank and file simply by expelling them from the union.

8. Although nominally represented by officialist labor federations, maquila unions, as a rule, had little influence in macro- and microcorporatist bargaining and only rarely engaged in strikes and other forms of labor conflict. Although a degree of labor mobilization has been centered in the city of Matamoros, these unions generally have a much longer history, stretching back well before the shift from ISI to ELG (Quintero Ramirez 1997; Samstad 1997).

9. An indication of this motivation was that after Salinas's new unionism speech, then-PRI President Luis Donaldo Colosio argued that for the ruling party to be revitalized it was "essential" for unions to democratize (Samstad and Collier 1995, 19).

10. For a detailed discussion of the CTM's successful efforts to retain the PRI's corporatist structure during the Salinas sexenio, see Mercado Anaya 1998. 11. The Salinas administration also made extensive efforts to reform the

PRI's "popular" sector, which included both government employee unions and a host of miscellaneous civic organizations. These efforts, too, would result in relatively few, mostly cosmetic, changes in this sector's corporatist structure. See Craske 1994.

12. May Day celebrations in Mexico had traditionally been used by officialist labor organizations to demonstrate their support for the government. The CT canceled the 1995 event in fear of protest by angry rank-and-file workers after a serious economic downturn. Zedillo thus reportedly became the first Mexican president since 1925 not to march in the annual May 1 parade (Bellinghausen 1995).

13. Gordillo also participated in the Foro in her capacity as head of the Instituto de Estudios Educativos y Sindicales de America (IEESA). Gordillo's close association with the PRI was not an issue in the split, as Hernandez Juarez and others in Fesebes continued to be members of the ruling party at this point.

14. The remaining groups were the Consejo Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT), the Federaci6n Obrera de Sindicatos de Mexico (FOSM), the Sindicato Nacional de Transporte (SINTA), the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Pesca (SUTSP), and the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores al Serviciodel Estado de Entidades y Municipios (FSTSGEM).

15. Claims by Mexican unions as to the size of their membership are often wildly exaggerated, and the statistic for UNT's size may even include

dissident factions of non-UNT unions. This figure, therefore, should be interpreted with caution.

16. Although the pact was principally negotiated between the CTM and COPARMEX, a number of other labor confederations and business organizations eventually signed the final document. Reflecting the split by this time in the labor movement, virtually all the unions in the Foro refused to sign. President Zedillo, for his part, did act as an official witness to the signing of the pact, although his administration's participation in the creation of the document appears to have been minimal.

17. In the context of an ongoing economic crisis, the administration did manage to win official consent from the entire CT for the October 1995 accords. The only notable signature absent was that of the then-governor of Guanajuato, Vicente Fox, who, along with every other governor, was expected to sign the pact pro forma (Rivera 1995). The future president objected to signing a document he had not even been given the chance to read.

18. While the content of the labor law negotiations was never made public, both of the main left and right opposition parties (the PRD and the PAN) issued official statements at the time of congressional authorization of labor law negotiations in which they called for an end to tripartite negotiations at both the macro and micro levels (Ortega and Solis de Alba 1999, 163-67).

19. Virtually the only union leader who declared his willingness to see negotiations over modifying the federal labor law was Francisco Hernandez Juarez of the STRM, who argued that if the labor movement did not agree to discuss the issue, the law might be altered without labor's input (Samstad and Collier 1995, 29). After the Zedillo administration issued its 1995-2000 National Development Plan calling for revisions to the federal labor law, however, even Hernandez Juarez changed his own position and publicly opposed any alteration in the face of what he feared would be a unilateral imposition of changes favorable to the business sector (Becerril 1995b).

20. For example, Labastida opponents in the PRI charged that after serious flooding in central and southern Mexico a month before the primary, federal welfare officials distributed relief packages emblazoned with Labastida's campaign logo (Garcia 1999b, 1999a). Charging opposition dirty tricks, the Labastida campaign denied responsibility.

21. Practically the only exception to this pattern was the Confederation Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC), which endorsed Manuel Bartlett, the ex-governor of Puebla. This endorsement, however, was made months before Labastida announced his candidacy (Carrizales 1999).

22. Castaneda (1999) provides one of the few solid sources regarding the dedazo. According to his interviews with four former Mexican presidents, Velazquez would only rarely take a clear position for or against a particular candidate, and even then he did not always succeed in persuading the president. See pages 48, 87, 104-6, 161-62, 281-82, and 308 for recollections of four expresidents themselves regarding labor's role, and pages 425-26, 436, and 500 for similar testimony by other key players in the process.

23. In accordance with constitutional reforms adopted in 1993 and 1996, a total of 128 senators and 500 federal deputies are elected nationally, some by plurality and some by proportional representation.

24. An example of labor's continuing organizational strength was the ability of the SME electrical workers to block in Congress the Zedillo administration's proposed constitutional amendment allowing the privatization of their sector. See Samstad 2000.

25. The FSTSE's power was undercut during the Zedillo administration by a May 1999 Supreme Court decision allowing government workers to affiliate with other, non-FSTSE labor organizations. Although this was an important step away from earlier corporatist laws granting FSTSE rights to a monopoly on representation in this sector, the federation is likely to retain an overwhelming majority of government workers for the foreseeable future.

26. Even during the 2000 campaign, when candidate Labastida frequently promised a "new PRI," reliance on organized labor was evident. For example, members of the SNTE teachers' union were assigned the visible and important task of acting as the party's pollwatchers on election day (Correa and Delgado 2000).

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-. 1998. Union Legacies and the Politics of Productivity: Corporatism, Clientelism, and Firm Reorganization During the Transition to Export-Led Development in Mexico. Ph.D. diss., Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.

2000. Mexican Unions in the Aftermath of Free Trade: Reevaluating "New Unionism" Among the SME Electrical Workers. Paper presented at the 21st International Conference of the Latin American Studies Association, Miami, March 16-18.

Samstad, James G., and Ruth Berins Collier. 1995. Mexican Labor and Structural Reform Under Salinas: New Unionism or Old Stalemate? In The Challenge of Institutional Reform in Mexico, ed. Riordan Roett. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 9-37.

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Urrutia, Alonso, Fabiola Martinez, and Martha Garcia. 1997. Hoy, la formal integraci6n de la UNT; agrupara a 1.5 millones de trabajadores. La Jornada. November 28.

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1997b. Invita a todas las organizaciones sindicales del pais a un dialogo de "reunificaci6n" obrera. La Jornada. June 27.

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James G. Samstad

James G. Samstad is a visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Irvine. He held the same title at Brown University from 2000 to 2002, and was also a staff researcher at the Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Tijuana. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1998.

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